Psychologies Magazine, April 2001 —
With the mass suicides, we have become accustomed to only talking about sects when these tragic excesses occur. For once, a real debate (1) is developing in civil society around a bill aimed at countering them. The question is not new. What can democracies do about sectarian groups? Should they be banned? The philosophers of the Enlightenment were already questioning, at the end of the Wars of Religion, how democratic societies could tolerate intolerant groups. Locke and Voltaire advocated the outright banning of sectarian ideologies... which led them to advocate the exclusion of Catholics! Western democracies have finally moved towards secularism: absolute freedom of belief and the separation of religion and politics. Very well, we will be told, but can we not ban sects which are based on an intolerant ideology, divert a spiritual ideal to the benefit of the absolute power of the group or the guru, and abuse the psychological weakness of an individual to make him dependent?
The problem isn't that simple. We would first need to agree on the highly subjective definition of a sectarian group. Thus, in the 1950s and 1970s, the Communist Party was labeled a "sect" by many. A Catholic monastery may be labeled a "sect" by atheist parents: vow of obedience, limited contact with family, lack of sleep, etc. For traditionalist Catholics, on the contrary, it will be a New Age group that will often be equated with a sect. The bill currently under discussion attempts to avoid this semantic trap by proposing the creation of a "crime of mental manipulation." But the text has sparked a storm of protest, particularly among representatives of major religions, who also feel targeted. "Any speaker with a natural influence over his audience could be accused of mental manipulation," protests Chief Rabbi Joseph Sitruk. And the problem goes beyond religion. Anyone can be accused of mental manipulation: a teacher with his students, parents with their children, a psychoanalyst with his patients, a boss with his employees, not to mention advertisers, the media, opinion leaders, etc. Since manipulation is everywhere at work in social relations, what criteria can be used to define a crime?
I would add an objection, which is more psychological. Contrary to journalistic clichés, the follower is not a prisoner of the sect: he entered it of his own free will and can leave at any time. The problem is that he doesn't want to. He is not locked behind bars, but in an internal prison: that of psychological dependence. Very often, in fact, the cult's hold is played out in this psychological interaction between a group or a charismatic leader, and individuals who project onto him all sorts of expectations and unresolved infantile problems. One does not "fall" into a sect, one joins it. The "victims," like those of alcohol, drugs, or tobacco, are, in fact, consenting. This is the tragedy of any addiction. Can we pass a law that is ultimately intended to protect individuals from themselves, against their will? In the 1980s, American associations kidnapped followers and subjected them to forced "deprogramming" sessions. These illegal actions were not only condemned by the courts, but also often led to disastrous results: suicides, psychotic breakdowns, etc.
Faced with the problem of sectarianism, any specific legislative action would, unfortunately, risk creating more problems than it would solve. We cannot demand a vaccine or a miracle cure from the State. Of course, information, prevention, and social vigilance are necessary, which is the responsibility of the Interministerial Mission to Combat Sects (Mils). The courts must also firmly condemn the offenses provided for in the penal code: rape, fraud, attacks on liberty, etc. But nothing can replace the responsibility of each individual, their common sense, their critical thinking, their ability to discern true prophets from false ones.
1- For a very relevant sociological analysis of the question, read “Religion in Pieces or the Question of Sects” by Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Calmann-Lévy, 2001.
April 2001