Psychologies Magazine, April 2001 —
Given the frequency of mass suicides, we have become accustomed to discussing cults only in the context of these tragic events. For once, a genuine debate (1) is unfolding in civil society around a proposed law aimed at combating them. The question is not new. What can democracies do in the face of cult groups? Should they be banned? Enlightenment philosophers, in the aftermath of the Wars of Religion, were already grappling with how democratic societies could tolerate intolerant groups. Locke and Voltaire advocated the outright prohibition of cult ideologies… which led them to advocate the exclusion of Catholics! Western democracies have ultimately moved towards secularism: absolute freedom of belief and the separation of religion and politics. Very well, we will be told, but can't we ban sects that are based on an intolerant ideology, that distort a spiritual ideal for the benefit of the absolute power of the group or the guru, and that abuse the psychological weakness of an individual to make him dependent?
The problem isn't so simple. First, we would need to agree on the highly subjective definition of a cult. For example, in the 1950s and 70s, the Communist Party was labeled a "cult" by many. A Catholic monastery might be considered one by atheist parents: vows of obedience, limited contact with family, lack of sleep, and so on. For traditionalist Catholics, on the other hand, a New Age group is often likened to a cult. The bill currently under discussion attempts to avoid this semantic trap by proposing the creation of a "crime of mind manipulation." But the text has sparked a storm of protest, particularly among representatives of major religions who also feel targeted. "Any speaker with a natural influence over their audience could be accused of mind manipulation," protests Chief Rabbi Joseph Sitruk. And the problem extends beyond the realm of religion. Anyone can be accused of mental manipulation: a teacher with their students, parents with their children, a psychoanalyst with their patients, a boss with their employees, not to mention advertisers, the media, opinion leaders, etc. Since manipulation is at work everywhere in social relationships, what criteria can be used to define a crime?
I would add an objection, which is more psychological in nature. Contrary to journalistic clichés, the follower is not a prisoner of the sect: they entered willingly and can leave at any time. The problem is that they don't want to. They are not locked behind bars, but in an inner prison: that of psychological dependence. Indeed, cult influence often plays out in this psychological interaction between a group or a charismatic leader and individuals who project all sorts of unresolved childhood expectations and issues onto them. One does not "fall" into a sect, one joins it. The "victims," like those of alcohol, drugs, or tobacco, are, in fact, consenting. This is the tragedy of all addiction. Can we pass a law whose ultimate purpose is to protect individuals from themselves, against their will? In the 1980s, American groups kidnapped followers and subjected them to forced "deprogramming" sessions. Besides being condemned by the courts, these illegal actions most often led to disastrous results: suicides, psychotic breakdowns, etc.
Faced with the problem of cults, any specific legislative action would, unfortunately, risk creating more problems than it solves. We cannot expect the State to provide a vaccine or a miracle cure. Of course, information, prevention, and social vigilance are necessary, and this falls under the purview of the Interministerial Mission for Combating Cults (Mils). The courts must also firmly condemn offenses stipulated by the penal code: rape, fraud, attacks on liberty, etc. But nothing can replace the responsibility of each individual, their common sense, their critical thinking, and their ability to distinguish true prophets from false ones.
1- For a very relevant sociological analysis of the question, read "La Religion en miettes ou la question des sectes" by Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Calmann-Lévy, 2001.
April 2001